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With the application of theory of institutional change and the method of 
dynamics game, in this dissertation I will study games of interest groups in the 
institutional change of non-tradable shares, with the incentive of interest and mainline 
of interest groups. 
Firstly, with the theory of institutional change I analyze interest games in the 
non-tradable shares institution for non-equilibrium, the study shows: As the political 
leading institutional change perform too mandatory, its one-sided emphasis on 
struggling for interests with the liquid-stock shareholders and denying the right to 
“vote with their hands”, the liquid-stock shareholders take the negative games of 
"voting with their feet" against the reform of non-tradable Shares which have failed for 
many times before. The new round of interest allocation mechanism to a certain 
extent have rectified the shortcut of the political mandatory as before, and the 
liquid-stock shareholders gained the right to “vote with their hands”. 
Then, with dynamics game model I analyze the interest games of the new round 
of institutional change of non-tradable shares. Under the new round of interest 
allocation mechanisms, to get successful in the reform, the key point lies in that the 
pricing level that tradable & non-tradable Shares Holders anticipate to the company's 
future development prospects is accepted by the two parties. With game models the 
study shows: to ensure that the interests of the liquid-stock shareholders come true 
and to achieve institutional change of non-tradable shares smoothly, the liquid-stock 
shareholders should treasure the right of " voting with their hands ",take positive 
game against illiquid-stock shareholders to maximize their utility; and the 
illiquid-stock shareholders should offer a reasonable price ,and avoid taking lucky 
psychology and unreasonable means to violate the liquid-stock shareholders; At the 
same time, the securities market regulator should take appropriate measures to remedy 













game of the reform achieve the virtuous circle of the game. 
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第一章   导    论 
§1.1  选题背景及意义 
一、 选题背景 
流通股与非流通股的分割即股权分置现象是中国股票市场在特殊的历史背








从 1994 年陆家嘴以每股 2 元的价格回购国有股开始，历史上有过多次减持
国有股的尝试。1999 年中共十五届四次会议明确提出了国有股减持的概念。2001 
年 6 月 12 日国务院正式发布《减持国有股筹集社会保障资金管理暂行办法》(以
下简称《暂行办法》)，办法的核心是上市公司在新发增发股票时应按融资额的
10 %出售国有股，所获收入全部上缴全国社会保障基金。2001 年 7 月 24 日，
四只新股宣布按发行新股数量的 10 %减持国有股并且明确是以市场价减持。此
消息一出引起股市的大幅度下跌。至 2001 年 10 月 22 日股票指数下降超过 30% 
股票市值，缩水近 6000 亿元。同时此事件也引发了我国证券市场空前的争论。
2001 年 10 月 22 日证监会宣布，停止《暂行办法》，两市股票即止跌反弹。2002 
年 6 月 23 日国务院决定除企业海外发行上市外，对国内上市公司停止执行《暂
行办法》，并不再出台具体实施办法。之后，中国股市也没有能够恢复元气，走
进了持续 4 年的漫漫熊途[1]。 






















































第一章   导    论 
 3


















































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
